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A B S T R A C T .   This article analyzes the legal arguments that students might make to 
compel states that subsidize private education through voucher, tax credit scholarship, and ESA 
programs to offer these programs on an equal basis, regardless of the sexual orientation or 
gender identity of the student or members of the student’s family.  The first section provides an 
overview of voucher programs and discusses the prevalence of participating schools with anti-
LGBT admissions policies.  The second section evaluates constitutional challenges that students 
could make to invalidate the anti-LGBT admissions policies of participating voucher schools 
under the state action doctrine. Specifically, we explain the possibilities and limitations of 
various approaches that may be used to challenge the anti-LGBT enrollment policies of 
participating private schools under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
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I . I N T R O D U C T I O N  
The headlines are troubling: 
• “Choice for most: In nation’s largest voucher program, $16 million 
went to schools with anti-LGBT policies”1 
• “Anti-LGBT Florida schools getting school vouchers”2 
• “Backed by State Money, Georgia Scholarships Go to Schools Barring 
Gays”3 
All tell the same story.  Some private schools participating in state programs 
that provide them with public funding apply admissions policies that prohibit the 
enrollment of LGBT students or students whose parents are engaged in same-sex 
relationships.4  On at least one occasion, a participating private school has refused 
to admit a student on account of an anti-LGBT admission policy. 5   The state-
operated programs in question involve types of private school choice programs that 
provide funding to families that they can use to attend private schools.6  These 
programs include educational vouchers, tuition tax credit scholarships, and 
educational savings accounts (ESAs).7 
To date, however, it appears that no student has challenged the legality of an 
anti-LGBT admission policy,8 which begs the question: Why not?  The answer may 
 
1  Julia Donheiser, Choice for Most: In Nation’s Largest Voucher Program, $16 Million Went to Schools 
with Anti-LGBT Policies, Chalkbeat (Aug. 10, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://www.chalkbeat.org/2017/8/10/
21107318/choice-for-most-in-nation-s-largest-voucher-program-16-million-went-to-schools-
with-anti-lgbt-polici [https://perma.cc/GD8F-T88E]. 
2  Leslie Postal & Annie Martin, Anti-LGBT Florida Schools Getting School Vouchers, Orlando 
Sentinel (Jan. 23, 2020, 11:24 AM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/education/os-ne-
voucher-schools-lgbtq-discriminate-20200123-s5ue4nvqybcgrbrxov5hcb46a4-htmlstory.html 
[https://perma.cc/G3KX-Y6AM].  
3  Kim Severson, Backed by State Money, Georgia Scholarships Go to Schools Barring Gays, N.Y. 
Times (Jan. 20, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/education/georgia-backed-scholar
ships-benefit-schools-barring-gays.html [https://perma.cc/XN2C-Y256]. 
4  Postal & Martin, supra note 2. 
5  Id. This article provides an example in Section I.  
6  Types of Private School Choice Programs, Am. Fed’n for Child., https://www.federationfor
children.org/school-choice-america/programs-qualifications/ [https://perma.cc/P46L-67KY]. 
Although there are several types of private-school-choice programs, this article will use the term 
“voucher” to encompass all of them. 
  Id.  
8  See, e.g., Kate Santich & Annie Martin, Florida Voucher Critics: Spend Money on Public Schools 
Instead, Orlando Sentinel (Feb. 21, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/
education/os-ne-black-pastors-school-vouchers-lgbtq-20200221-el5he7pdjvfujmfbwau6kcfj5y-
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lie in the ways in which these programs blend state actions with private decisions.  
State actors clearly may not discriminate against LGBT individuals,9 but the same is 
not true of private individuals.  This distinction complicates a potential litigant’s 
ability to challenge incidents such as those memorialized in the headlines.  Yet, it is 
likely that at some point students and their families will go to court to challenge 
their exclusion from one of these schools and the state program that funds it.10  They 
will undoubtedly claim that the private schools’ admissions policies, when part of a 
public program, violate the Constitution.11  As such, they will have to prove that the 
private schools’ conduct occurs as a result of state action.12  The state action doctrine 
provides that the Constitution only applies to the government and those who act on 
behalf of a governmental entity.13  However, there are exceptions to this rule in 
which private conduct must comply with the Constitution.14 
This article analyzes the legal arguments that students might make to compel 
states that subsidize private education through voucher, tax credit scholarship, and 
ESA programs to offer these programs on an equal basis, regardless of the sexual 
orientation or gender identity of the student or members of the student’s family.  
The first section provides an overview of voucher programs.  Among other things, 
we identify the differences among vouchers, tuition tax credit scholarships, and 
ESAs.  We also discuss the prevalence of participating schools with anti-LGBT 
admissions policies.  The second section evaluates constitutional challenges that 
students could make to invalidate the anti-LGBT admissions policies of 
participating voucher schools under the state action doctrine.  Specifically, we 
explain the possibilities and limitations of various approaches that may be used to 
 
story.html [https://perma.cc/8GQP-S4PD] (“there are no complaints on record from LGBTQ 
students about discrimination under the voucher program.”). 
9  See Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 
1050–54 (7th Cir. 2017). 
10  See, e.g., Florida House of Representatives Session Video, The Florida Channel (Mar. 6, 
2020), at 3:33:31 https://thefloridachannel.org/videos/3-6-20-house-session-part-1/ [https://perma
.cc/Q6YB-VD3X] (discussing the educational programming of Trinity Academy in Orlando, 
Florida).  
11  Adam Mengler, Note, Public Dollars, Private Discrimination: Protecting LGBT Students from School 
Voucher Discrimination, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 1251, 1263, 1267 (2018). 
12  Id. at 1273–74; Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 665 
(5th ed. 2015).  
13  Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 664; Martha Minow, Alternatives to the State Action Doctrine 
in the Era of Privatization, Mandatory Arbitration, and the Internet: Directing Law to Serve 
Human Needs, 52 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 145. 
14  Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 665.  
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challenge the anti-LGBT enrollment policies of participating private schools under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I I . O V E R V I E W  O F  S C H O O L  V O U C H E R S  
School voucher programs have a lengthy history of discrimination.15  Indeed, 
the first instances of publicly funded school choice were specifically designed to 
discriminate by closing public schools and providing tax-supported vouchers to 
private schools that enrolled only white students.16  These private schools, which 
were often called ‘“choice’ academies” or “segregation academies,” were created in 
several southern states to circumvent desegregation orders after the Brown v. Board 
of Education17 decision.18  However, in 1964, the Supreme Court rejected this strategy 
for avoiding segregation orders in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County.19  
Interestingly, Milton Friedman, who is generally considered the architect of 
voucher programs, predicted that vouchers would result in schools categorized by 
race and other status characteristics.20  As he wrote in his 1962 treatise, Capitalism 
and Freedom:  
If a [voucher] proposal like that of the preceding chapter were adopted, it would 
permit a variety of schools to develop, some all white, some all Negro, some mixed. . . .It 
would in this special area, as the market does in general, permit co-operation without 
conformity.21 
In a note to this passage, Friedman explained that “[t]o avoid 
 
15  Julie F. Mead, How Legislation and Litigation Shape School Choice, in Exploring the School 
Choice Universe: Evidence and Recommendations 39, 41–42 (Gary Miron et al eds., 2012); 
Mark A. Gooden et al., Race and School Vouchers: Legal, Historical, and Political Contexts, 91 Peabody 
J. of Educ. 522, 524 (2016); Julie F. Mead & Suzanne E. Eckes, How School Privatization Opens the 
Door for Discrimination (Nat’l Educ. Pol’y Ctr. Pol’y Brief) Dec. 6, 2018, at 6–7 (see this source for our 
earlier discussion on the discriminatory practices in school voucher programs); Kevin G. Welner 
& Preston C. Green, Private School Vouchers: Legal Challenges and Civils Rights Protections 1–2 
(Mar. 5, 2018) (working paper for the UCLA Civil Rights Project, on file with author); Eckes, Mead, 
& Ulm, infra note 29. 
16  Gooden et al., supra note 15, at 524; Welner & Green, supra note 15, at 1. 
17  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
18  Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: School Choice, the Constitution, and Civil 
Society 29 (Brookings Inst. Press, 1999).  
19  377 U.S. 218, 233–34 (1964).  
20  Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 117 (3rd ed. 2002). 
21  Id. at 117–18. 
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misunderstanding, . . . I am taking it for granted that the minimum requirements 
imposed on schools in order that vouchers be usable do not include whether the 
school is segregated or not.”22  As voucher programs began to be seriously discussed 
as educational policy initiatives in the 1990s, major voucher theorists Chubb and 
Moe posited that voucher systems should accept whatever sorting of students 
resulted from parental choices, as long as no overt racial discrimination occurred.23 
Considering the history of vouchers, it was unsurprising that researchers 
warned that a full embrace of publicly funding parental choices in private schools 
would result in the demise of the common school.24  The first contemporary voucher 
programs were developed in the early 1990s.  These programs gave eligible families 
public funds to attend private schools, and they were upheld on the grounds that 
they served the legitimate purpose of addressing persistent concerns about poor 
public school performance. 25   The amount of the voucher, like the program 
eligibility requirements, is set by state statute.26 
After the Supreme Court concluded in 2002 that the Establishment Clause 
permitted states to include religious schools in their voucher programs, those 
programs began to spread.27  A voucher is a government-funded coupon given to a 
parent or guardian that is redeemable for tuition fees at a non-public school.  There 
are sixteen states and the District of Columbia that have at least one voucher 
program.28 
In addition to voucher programs, some other choice options include education 
savings accounts (ESAs) and tax credit scholarships.  Tax credit scholarships and 
ESAs are voucher-like programs because all three provide public subsidies to private 
 
22  Id. at 118 n.2. 
23  John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, & America’s Schools 221–22 (1990). 
24  Ann Bastian, School Choice: Unwrapping the Package, in Choice in Education: Potential and 
Problems 177–186 (William L. Boyd & Herbert J. Walberg eds., 1990); Albert Shanker & Bella 
Rosenberg, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools: A Rejoinder, in Independent Schools, 
Independent Thinkers 335–57 (Pearl Rock Kane ed., 1992); Julie Underwood, Choice is Not a 
Panacea, 71 EDUC. L. REP. 599, 607–08 (1992). 
25  Davis ex rel. Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 546 (Wis. 1992). 
26  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 119.23(4)(bg) (2013). 
27  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002). 
28  School Choice in America Dashboard, EdChoice, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/
school-choice-in-america/#map-overlay [https://perma.cc/9FH5-4M5C]. See also Welner & Green, 
supra note 15. 
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education.29  An ESA is a tax-deferred trust account created by the government that 
assists families in funding educational expenses for children who are eighteen-
years-old or younger.30  The parent is also permitted, depending on the state, to use 
the funds for a wide variety of purposes, including homeschooling expenses or 
private tutoring.31  Typically, the parent receives a statutorily defined amount of 
funds, often an amount linked to the amount of state aid a child would have received 
if enrolled in a public school.32  There are five states that offer ESAs.33  Tax credit 
scholarships allow taxpayers to receive full or partial tax credits when they donate to 
nonprofits that provide private school scholarships.34  Nineteen states offer one or 
more forms of tax credit scholarship programs.35  While any of the three forms of 
subsidy may be the subject of a challenge, most of the discussion in this article 
focuses on voucher programs. 
All three types of programs share some commonalities.  All set eligibility 
requirements for children and families to participate.  Some programs may set 
income limits,36 while others may be targeted for children with disabilities.37  All 
programs also set requirements for private school participation and require the 
schools to register with the state as program participants. 38   For example, 
requirements may mandate that schools disclose information to prospective 
students and their families or may require schools to submit to program audits.39  
Programs may also set minimum standards for teacher and administrator 
education. 40  While it is common for states to require that schools avoid racial 
 
29  See Suzanne E. Eckes, Julie F. Mead, & Jessica Ulm, Dollars to Discriminate: The (Un)intended 
Consequences of School Vouchers, 91 Peabody J. of Educ. 537, 538 (2016). There are also tax 
credit/deduction programs that are not discussed.  A tax credit/deduction program reduces the 
amount of income tax that must be paid in order to help families pay for private education.  There 
are eight states that have at least one tax credit/deduction programs. 
30  Id. at 544. 
31  See Types of Private School Choice Programs, supra note 6. 
32  Id. 
33  School Choice in America Dashboard, supra note 28. 
34  Types of School Choice, EdChoice, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/types-of-school-
choice/ [https://perma.cc/3ST5-S5B2].  
35  School Choice in America Dashboard, supra note 28. 
36  See id. 
37  Types of School Choice, supra note 34.  
38  See Types of Private School Choice Programs, supra note 6. 
39  See Types of School Choice, supra note 34.  
40  Id. 
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discrimination,41 only one state, Maryland, has set a specific non-discriminatory 
standard with regard to sexual orientation and gender identity.42 
In fact, as states created new forms of publicly funded educational options in 
the form of voucher programs, tax credit scholarships, and ESAs, issues of 
discrimination have indeed surfaced.43  The question of whether and to what degree 
schools should be available to all children without regard to race, national origin, 
religion, immigration status, first language, sex, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, and disability has a long litigious history.44  It is now routine to observe 
that public schools must enroll all students.  This has not been the case with voucher 
programs. 
Private schools that participate in voucher programs are sometimes racially and 
socioeconomically concentrated and typically enroll fewer children with disabilities 
and English language learners.45  Traditional public schools and charter schools are 
prohibited from engaging in this type of discrimination through U.S. constitutional 
law (e.g., the Equal Protection Clause) and a series of federal statutes (e.g., Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the Education Amendments, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).  Although these 
laws may not apply to private schools, states could make non-discriminatory access 
and operation a condition that private schools must meet in order to participate in 
a voucher program. 46  But so far, legislators have generally elected not to do so.47   In 
 
41  Eckes, Mead, & Ulm, supra note 29, at 546. 
42  Suzanne E. Eckes & Julie F. Mead, Discriminatory Practices in Voucher Programs, Phi Delta 
Kappan (Feb. 24, 2020), https://kappanonline.org/discriminatory-practices-school-voucher-
programs-eckes-mead/ [https://perma.cc/25H9-Q2XA]. North Carolina’s voucher program was 
recently challenged for allegedly discriminating against students based on religion and sexuality. 
See Complaint at ¶¶ 47, 47.a, 86, Walker v. State of North Carolina, No. 20CVS8346 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 
July 27, 2020). 
43  Eckes, Mead, & Ulm, supra note 29; Valerie Strauss, Problems with Charter Schools that You Won’t 
Hear Betsy DeVos Talk About, Wash. Post (June 22, 2017, 10:05 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/06/22/problems-with-charter-schools-that-you-wont-
hear-betsy-devos-talk-about/?utm_term=.0630221d571f [https://perma.cc/2LCG-BWQA]. 
44  See Martha Minow, In Brown’s Wake 33–51 (2010). 
45  Cory Turner, The Promise and Peril of School Vouchers, Nat’l Pub. Radio (May 12, 2017, 6:00 
AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/05/12/520111511/the-promise-and-peril-of-school-
vouchers [https://perma.cc/5C8F-EL8U]. 
46  See Eckes, Mead, & Ulm, supra note 29, at 555. 
47  Maryland is the only state that specifically includes sexual orientation and gender identity in 
its anti-discrimination provisions that apply to voucher recipients. See Eckes & Mead, supra note 
29. 
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fact, most state voucher laws provide protection against discrimination based on 
race and ethnicity; no state laws provide explicit protections for all historically 
marginalized populations (those discriminated against on grounds minimally 
including religion, race, national origin/ethnicity, disability, sex, and sexual 
orientation).48  
Moreover, although the voucher program upheld by the Supreme Court in 2002 
included provisions to guard against religious discrimination, 49  some religious 
schools participating in voucher programs enacted since 2002 exclude students and 
families from other religions, and/or exclude LGBT employees and students, as well 
as students from LGBT families.50  This topic is especially timely as states continue 
to create and expand voucher programs.  
When asked whether LGBT students and their families would be welcome at a 
private Christian school in Indiana, the principal responded, “We believe that the 
Bible clearly teaches that a gay/lesbian lifestyle is contrary to God’s commands. 
LGBT students and families would not be able to sign agreement with our 
Statement of Faith.”51  Another principal stated that “We welcome any student and 
any family that will acknowledge and respect our statement of faith, core values and 
philosophy.”52  The practice of excluding students and families on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity may be widespread in the state.  For example, the 
Archdiocese of Indianapolis reported that their schools received $38.9 million 
toward tuition from the voucher program during the 2018–19 school year.53  A recent 
policy from the archdiocese states that transgender students may not be eligible for 
enrollment.54  
 
48  Id.; See also Eckes, Mead, & Ulm, supra note 29, at 551.  
49  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002). 
50  Donheiser, supra note 1.  
51  Jeff LaFave, Hotline: A Sensitive Voucher Question, Bloomington Herald-Times (Feb. 10, 
2014), https://www.hoosiertimes.com/herald_times_online/opinion/hotline-a-sensitive-voucher
-question/article_104db739-2017-5322-9c90-578474cd8307.html [https://perma.cc/6EDT-5WEV]; 
Eckes, Mead, & Ulm, supra note 29. 
52  Id. 
53  Office of Catholic Schools: Catholic Schools, ArchIndy.org, https://www.archindy.org/ocs/
schools.html [https://perma.cc/UW5K-9ZJM]. 
54  Arika Herron, Policy May Bar Transgender Students from Catholic Schools in Central and Southern 
Indiana, Indianapolis Star (June 24, 2020, 5:12 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/
education/2020/06/24/indianapolis-archdiocese-new-policy-may-bar-transgender-students-
attending-catholic-schools/3252282001/ [https://perma.cc/W2JV-USSW]. 
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Georgia, too, has gained attention for this type of exclusion.55  One study found 
that at least one-third of the private schools participating in Georgia’s program had 
explicit anti-gay policies. 56   The study documented how both admissions and 
discipline policies work to restrict enrollment for LGBT children and families.57  The 
report also pointed out that some national organizations for private schools 
encourage such policies based on their interpretation of the Bible.58 
Florida is another state with a record of participating religious schools that 
exclude students on the basis of sexual orientation.  In fact, the Orlando Sentinel 
revealed that 83 schools had rules that refused to admit LGBT students or would 
expel them upon discovering their sexual orientation and gender identity.59  Some 
schools also denied admittance to students on the basis of their parents’ sexual 
orientations. 60   This reporting also revealed the plight of Cari and Nicole 
Haagenson, a same-sex couple.61  Cari sought to enroll her two oldest children in the 
Master’s Academy of Vero Beach, a school that the children had previously attended 
when Cari was married to a man.62  The school refused to admit the girls upon 
learning about Cari’s relationship with another woman.63  
I I I . S T A T E  A C T I O N  C H A L L E N G E S  
Students and parents like the Haagensons may eventually challenge their 
exclusion from certain voucher schools on the account of sexual orientation by 
filing suit against the private school, the state, or both.  Claims of discriminatory 
exclusion are typically cast as denials of equal protection as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.64  If families allege a federal constitutional violation, they 
will have to overcome the state action doctrine.  As such, they will have to establish 
that the actions of a state actor caused the exclusion and that the denial constitutes 
 
55  Severson, supra note 3. 
56  Georgia’s Tax Dollars Help Finance Private Schools with Severe Anti-Gay Policies, Practices, 
& Teachings, Issue Brief (S. Educ. Found., Atlanta, G.A.), Jan. 2013, at 1–2. 
57  Id. at 3–4. 
58  Id. at 16. 
59  Postal & Martin, supra note 2. 
60  Id.  
61  Id. 
62  Id.  
63  Id.  
64  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 710–11 (2007); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967). 
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an unjustifiable action that violates the federal Constitution’s mandate of equal 
treatment for similarly situated individuals.65  
This section analyzes the possibility of a state action claim.  Because the 
challenge involves a claim of discrimination, the first subpart examines whether the 
exclusion of a student on the basis of LGBT status would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.  The second subpart then discusses the challenge based on five state action 
theories applied by the Supreme Court: (1) the public function test, (2) the symbiotic 
relationship test, (3) the state compulsion test, (4) the entwinement test, and (5) the 
state enforcement test.  As noted earlier, the interaction of state programming with 
private actors, both schools and parents, presents challenges to any litigant wishing 
to challenge the exclusionary practices of these schools.  The analysis shows, 
however, that two theories appear to hold more promise for those who may elect to 
contest current practices. 
A. Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a 
state shall not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”66  This clause grants to all Americans “[the] right to be free from invidious 
discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity”67 and 
requires that similarly-situated individuals be treated the same.68 
LGBT students in public schools have argued that under the Equal Protection 
Clause, school policies should not treat them differently than heterosexual 
students.69  When analyzing an Equal Protection Clause claim, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has created three levels of judicial scrutiny for certain classifications of 
individuals (i.e., strict scrutiny, intermediate (or heightened) scrutiny, and rational 
basis review).70  Under these levels of scrutiny, it is easier for the state to justify 
treating students differently based on sex than it is race.  To illustrate, racial 
classifications fall under strict scrutiny, which requires “both a compelling 
governmental objective and a demonstration that the classification is necessary and 
 
65  John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Principles of Constitutional Law 343–45 (2010). 
66  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
67  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980).  
68  Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 65, at 420. 
69  See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1996); Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 
400 F. Supp. 3d 444, 451 (E.D. Va. 2019); Kasper ex rel. Adams v. School Bd., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 
1297 (M.D. Fla. 2018); M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 709–10 (D. Md. 2018). 
70  Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 65, at 426–28. 
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narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”71  Few governmental actions can survive 
strict scrutiny.72  
The next level is intermediate or heightened scrutiny, which is the standard 
used when the government makes sex-based classifications. 73   The government 
must demonstrate that “the classification based on sex serves important 
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are 
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”74   
Accordingly, if a school board adopted a policy that prohibited girls from 
attending school after age fifteen, it would need to have an important state objective 
in adopting such a policy and demonstrate that this sex-based classification was 
substantially related to serve that important interest.  It would be difficult for any 
school board to enforce such a policy because there is no important state interest 
involved in prohibiting girls from attending school after age fifteen.  It should be 
noted that it is not entirely clear within the judicial system whether discrimination 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity would receive intermediate scrutiny 
review. 75   In 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court held that within employment, 
discrimination “because of sex” includes discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity, although that case was litigated under a federal 
statute, Title VII, and not a constitutional theory.76  Other lower federal courts have 
analyzed the issue under an Equal Protection framework and found that 
discrimination based on sex also includes sexual orientation and gender identity 
when analyzing cases involving discrimination of LGBT students.77 
The third and default level of judicial scrutiny is rational basis review, which 
requires “a legitimate government objective with a minimally rational relationship 
 
71  Suzanne E. Eckes & Stephanie D. McCall, The Potential Impact of Social Science Research on Legal 
Issues Surrounding Single-Sex Classrooms and Schools, 50 Educ. Admin. Q. 195, 199–200 (2014). See also 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218–20 (1995). 
72  See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 65, at 426–27. 
73  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 555 (1996). 
74  Eckes & McCall, supra note 71, at 202. 
75  See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying rational basis review when 
student alleged discrimination based on sexual orientation); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 
464 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that sexual orientation discrimination in the military was subject to 
rational basis review). 
76  Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1740, 1744 (2020). 
77  See Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017); 
Handling ex rel. A.H. v. Minersville Area Sch. Dist., 408 F. Supp. 3d 536, 573–75 (M.D. Pa. 2019); 
J.A.W. v. Evansville Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 3d 833, 842, 843 (S.D. Ind. 2019). 
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between the means and the ends.”78  This deferential level of review stems from the 
balance of powers between different parts of the government.  When applying 
rational basis review, jurists do not weigh the wisdom or effectiveness of a policy, 
only its rationality.79  If a policy-making body articulates a rationale within the scope 
of its authority, the policy is likely to be upheld under rational basis review, even if 
a judge or judges disagree with the rationale given. 80  Classifications based on 
sexual orientation, for example, have oftentimes fallen under this level of scrutiny 
in the past.81  Rational basis review is a very low level of judicial scrutiny and as a 
result, if this level of analysis is applied, it is much easier to justify a government 
policy that treats LGBT students differently from other students.  
In a public school, an LGBT student who experienced discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity could rely on the Equal Protection Clause to 
challenge school officials.  Likewise, if plaintiffs demonstrate the presence of state 
action in a private school voucher program, these protections would also apply.  
Although the Supreme Court has found that racial discrimination in private schools 
violates the Equal Protection Clause82 or Section 1981,83 the Court has yet to extend 
this thinking for private schools’ treatment of LGBT individuals and as such, it is a 
more difficult argument within the context of voucher programs, particularly when 
those schools claim religion as their reason for action.  As will be discussed, even 
when the private school accepts millions of dollars of taxpayer money through the 
state’s voucher program, it is unclear whether a court would find state action.  
Without a finding of state action for LGBT discrimination in private schools, 
students likely have no constitutional protections available.  
B. State Action 
1. Public Function Test 
The public function test provides that a private entity must adhere to the 
 
78  Eckes & McCall, supra note 71, at 199 (citation omitted). 
79  Nowak & Ronald, supra note 65, at 426. 
80  See id. 
81  See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 454 (7th Cir. 1996). 
82  See Norwood v. Harris, 413 U.S. 455, 455 (1973) (invalidating state program that provided 
textbooks to both public and private schools because state did not consider whether private 
schools practiced racial discrimination). 
83  See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976) (holding that Section 1981 prohibited the 
racially discriminatory policies of private schools). However, the Court’s holding in Runyon did 
not address whether Section 1981 applied to private sectarian schools. Id. at 167. 
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Constitution if it is carrying out a task that has been traditionally exclusively 
performed by the government.84   In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,85  the Supreme Court 
applied the public function test for the first time to a private school.  This case 
involved a private high school designed to provide support to at-risk youth.86  Public 
school authorities would refer students to the private school and pay the tuition 
costs for their attendance.87  While the school was privately owned and operated, 
the majority of its funding resulted from public sources.88  A dispute arose at the 
school when a few teachers who were fired argued that they did not receive due 
process in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 89   Note that the 
challengers in this case sued the school directly and argued that the private school 
officials were actually state actors because of the close relationship between the 
school and the public officials who referred children to them.90  The Court rejected 
the teachers’ contention that the school was a state actor because it performed the 
public function of providing an education.91  To satisfy the public function test, the 
provision of education has to be the “exclusive prerogative of the State.”92   The 
legislature’s decision to provide services to troubled students at public expense “in 
no way makes these services the exclusive province of the State.”   Since the Rendell-
Baker decision, several courts have held that private schools are not state actors 
under the public function test.94  It follows, then, that the anti-LGBT admissions 
policies of private schools would not be subject to review under this legal theory. 
2. Symbiotic Relationship Test 
The symbiotic relationship test examines whether the government has so 
 
84  Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 672. 
85  Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 836–37 (1982). 
86  Id. at 831–32. 
87  Id. at 832. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. at 834. 
90  See id. at 835–36. 
91  Id. at 842. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  See, e.g., Dawkins v. Biondi Educ. Ctr., 164 F. Supp. 3d 518, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Johnson v. 
Pinkerton Acad., 861 F.2d 335, 338 (1st Cir. 1988); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646–47 (3rd Cir. 2010); 
Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Central Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2002); Robert S. v. Stetson 
Sch., Inc., 256 F.3d 159, 166 (3rd Cir. 2001). 
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“insinuated itself into a position of interdependence” with the private entity “that it 
must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”95  The Supreme 
Court first established this test in Burton v. Wilmington Park Authority.96  In this case, 
a restaurant that leased space from a parking garage operated by the city parking 
authority refused to serve Black customers.97  The parking authority was a tax-
exempt, private corporation created by legislative action of the city for the purpose 
of operating the city’s parking facilities. 98   The parking authority provided the 
restaurant utilities and helped maintain the premises.99  One of the patrons alleged 
that this discriminatory treatment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.100  The Delaware Supreme Court ruled against the patron 
because the restaurant was acting in a purely private capacity.101  
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the state legislature created the 
parking authority and in so doing gave it broad powers.102  The Court reasoned that 
there was sufficient state action to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause; 
the restaurant was located on public property, and the rent from the restaurant 
financially supported the parking authority.103  In fact, the Court suggested that the 
state behaved like a joint participant in the operation of this restaurant, reasoning 
that the state’s financial position would suffer if the restaurant did not 
discriminate. 104   In other words, the state profited from the restaurant’s 
discriminatory actions; it was also noted that the restaurant benefited from the 
parking authority’s tax-exempt status. 105   As a result, the Court found that the 
restaurant and parking authority were so physically and financially intertwined 
that the private restaurant’s conduct could be imputed to the government.106  
In Rendell-Baker, however, the Court refused to find that a private school for at-
 
95  Rodriguez-Garcia v. Davila, 904 F.2d 90, 98 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington 
Park. Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)). 
96  Burton, 365 U.S. at 725. 
97  Id. at 715. 
98  Id. at 717–18. 
99  Id. at 720. 
100  Id.  
101  Id. at 721. 
102  Id. at 723–24. 
103  Id. at 723, 725. 
104  Id. at 724. 
105  Id.  
106  Id. at 725. 
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risk students had a symbiotic relationship with the government even though the 
school received virtually all of its income from governmental funding.107  The Court 
distinguished the Burton case by observing that the government had financially 
benefited from the restaurant’s discriminatory conduct.108  In contrast, the private 
school: 
is not fundamentally different from many private corporations whose business 
depends primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for 
the government. Acts of such private contractors do not become acts of the government 
by reason of their significant or even total engagement in performing public 
contracts.109  
Because the school’s fiscal relationship with the government was “not different 
from that of many contractors performing services for the government,” the Court 
concluded that there was no symbiotic relationship, as in Burton.110  
In Dawkins v. Biondi Education Center, 111  the Southern District of New York 
applied Rendell-Baker to determine whether defendants who worked for a “public 
high school with private status” violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the symbiotic 
relationship test.112  New York law subjects these types of private schools to heavy 
regulation and close supervision.113  Additionally, these schools are almost entirely 
funded by the government.114  A former employee alleged that the school violated 
various constitutional provisions in the school’s decision to terminate him in 
violation of Section 1983.115  
The court granted the school’s motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim.116  The 
Southern District of New York refused to find that the school was a state actor under 
the symbiotic relationship test. 117   Citing Rendell-Baker, the court ruled that the 
receipt of public funding did not transform the school into a state actor.118  Rather, 
 
107  Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842–43 (1982). 
108  Id.  
109  Id. at 840–41. 
110  Id. at 843. 
111  Dawkins v. Biondi Educ. Ctr., 164 F. Supp. 3d 518, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
112  Id. at 521, 529. 
113  Id. at 521. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. at 521–22. 
116  Id. at 530. 
117  Id. at 528. 
118  Id. 
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the court explained, to satisfy the symbiotic relationship test, the employee would 
have to demonstrate “that this financial support specifically affected the decision to 
terminate his employment.” 119   Because the employee merely alleged that the 
defendants received substantial funding from the government, he failed to state a 
claim under the symbiotic relationship test.120  The employee further attempted to 
establish a symbiotic relationship by claiming that the government and the private 
schools were engaged in a joint venture: “the educating of New York State students 
with learning disabilities.” 121   The court rejected this assertion, noting that the 
relationship between the government and the defendants was “purely 
contractual.”122  As the court explained, private contractors who perform services 
with governmental funding do not become state actors “by reason of their 
significant or even total engagement in performing public contracts.”123 
These cases indicate that students will have a difficult time convincing a court 
that voucher schools with anti-LGBT admissions policies are state actors under the 
symbiotic relationship test.  Specifically, the students must show that the 
government must somehow benefit from the discriminatory conduct of the private 
school.  As these cases make clear, courts will not find such a benefit merely because 
the private school is providing educational services with governmental funding.  
3. State Compulsion Test 
The state compulsion test provides that “a State normally can be held 
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has 
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice 
must in law be deemed to be that of the state.”124  Additionally, this test cautions that 
“[m]ere approval or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient 
to justify holding the State responsible for those initiatives under the terms of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”125  
In Blum v. Yaretsy, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the state of New York 
coerced nursing homes to provide Medicaid recipients with lower levels of care in 
 
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. at 529. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. (quoting Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841). 
124  Id. (quoting Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841). 
125  Id. at 1004–05. 
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violation of the state action doctrine.126  The federal Medicaid program provides 
federal funding to states to reimburse certain medical costs incurred by people with 
low income.127  Federal regulations required that nursing homes providing care to 
Medicaid patients establish utilization review committees (URCs) of physicians to 
determine the level of care that patients needed. 128   Federal regulations also 
required URCs to inform the responsible state agency upon deciding that patients 
be discharged or transferred to a different level of care.  The state of New York’s 
policy provided Medicaid funding for private nursing home care through either 
“skilled nursing homes” (SNFs) or “health related facilities” (HRFs). 129   In cases 
where URCs recommended that patients be transferred to the less expensive 
alternative, the state would discontinue benefits unless the patients agreed to the 
transfer.130  
Medicaid patients who were subjected to this treatment alleged that the 
transfers deprived them of procedural due process rights to adequate notice under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.131  The Court rejected the patients’ claim that there was 
state action because New York law “affirmatively commands the summary 
discharge or transfer of Medicaid patients who are thought to be inappropriately 
placed in their nursing facilities.” 132   After analyzing the pertinent statutes and 
regulations, the Court concluded that these decisions “ultimately turn on medical 
judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not 
established by the state.”133  
In American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan,134 the Court addressed 
whether the state of Pennsylvania encouraged private insurers to withhold 
payments in violation of the state action doctrine.  The state amended its worker 
compensation law to authorize employers and insurers to withhold payment 
pending an independent review to decide whether treatment was “reasonable and 
necessary.”135  Workers brought a Section 1983 action, claiming that an insurance 
 
126  Id. at 1005. 
127  Id. at 993–94. 
128  Id.  
129  Id. at 994. 
130  Id. at 995. 
131  Id. at 995–96. 
132  Id. at 1005. 
133  Id. at 1008. 
134  American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 47 (1999). 
135  Id. at 43. 
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company had withheld particular benefits through the review procedure without 
providing due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.136 
The workers argued that Pennsylvania “encouraged” the withholding of 
payments by amending the statute to provide for utilization review, “an option they 
previously did not have.”137  The Court rejected this assertion.  It did acknowledge 
that the state’s provision of an option for insurers to defer payment pending review 
could be seen “as encouraging them to do just that.” 138   However, the Court 
characterized the state’s decision as “subtle encouragement” that was “no more 
significant than that which inheres the State’s creation or modification of any legal 
remedy.”139  Indeed, the Court continued, “[t]he State’s decision to allow insurers to 
withhold payments pending review can just as easily be seen as state inaction.”140  
The Court declared that it would not impose constitutional restraints on private 
actors by characterizing the state’s inaction as encouragement.141 
At first glance, the Blum case suggests that students would not be able to show 
that states had coerced private schools to discriminate against LGBT students under 
the state compulsion test.  To establish coercion, the students would have to 
demonstrate that the statutes and regulations force private schools to discriminate 
on the basis of sexual orientation.142  Private school choice laws appear to do no such 
thing.  For example, Florida’s Family Empowerment Scholarship Program, a 
voucher program for low-income students, provides, “[b]efore enrolling in a private 
school, a student and his or parent or guardian must meet with the private school’s 
principal or the principal’s designee to review the school’s. . . code of school 
conduct.”143  Similarly, Florida’s Tax Credit Scholarship Program, which is also for 
low-income students, declares, “[e]ach parent and each student has an obligation to 
the private school to comply with the private school’s published policies.”144  This 
language suggests that the private schools, not the state, make decisions as to 
whether students are eligible for admission.  Thus, it would seem that participating 
Florida private schools with anti-LGBT policies would not become state actors 
 
136  Id. at 47–48. 
137  Id. at 53. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 54. 
142  See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005–08 (explaining that New York Medicaid funding policy did not 
coerce private reviewers to place patients in nursing homes with lower levels of care). 
143  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1002.394(9)(e) (2020). 
144  Id. at § 1002.395(7)(d) (2020). 
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under a compulsion theory.  
However, Dumont v. Lyon145 suggests that Blum is not controlling for private-
school-choice programs because states, not private schools, are the state actors.  
Instead, state action might come from the states knowingly creating the 
mechanism that enables participating private schools to discriminate.  In this case, 
two Michigan same-sex couples alleged that state-contracted child placement 
agencies rejected them as prospective foster parents because of their sexual 
orientation.146  The couples brought a Section 1983 claim in federal district court, 
alleging that the state’s Department of Health and Human Services’ practice of 
allowing state-contracted and taxpayer funded agencies to use religious criteria to 
exclude prospective foster parents was in violation of the Establishment Clause and 
Equal Protection Clause.147  It is important to note here that, unlike the other cases 
reviewed above, the plaintiffs filed suit against the state itself, not against the 
private agencies that had declined to serve them because of their sexual 
orientation.148  In other words, they argued that the state acted in contravention of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  They did not argue that the private agencies should be 
considered state actors for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 
The State Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the decisions of the faith-
based agencies could not be attributed to the state per the Blum case.149  The court 
denied the defendant’s motion.150  In reaching this decision, the court distinguished 
Blum from the instant case.151  The same-sex couples challenged “a specific state 
procedure—the State’s procedure of contracting with faith-based child placing 
agencies that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.”152  Thus, the couples’ 
complaint was not based on the “purely private decisions on the faith-based 
agencies in turning them away.”153  
 
145  Dumont v. Lyon, 341 F. Supp. 3d 706, 713 (E.D. Mich. 2018). 
146  Id. at 713. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. The plaintiffs also argued that they had suffered stigmatic injury as a result of the denial 
of their application. Id. at 720. A stigmatic injury occurs as a result of discriminatory treatment. A 
child denied admission to a voucher school might likewise claim to be the victim of a stigmatic 
injury. 
149  Id. at 744. 
150  Id. at 747. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. at 745. 
153  Id. 
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The court went on to say that Blum was not controlling.154  “Because the state 
actors in Blum took no action themselves,” the decision explained, “the Supreme 
Court necessarily had to determine whether the state should be obligated to 
shoulder the blame for solely private action.”155  Conversely, the couples’ assertions 
in the instant case suggested that faith-based agencies could refuse to work with 
same-sex couples only because of the state department’s practice of entering into 
contracts permitting such refusals.156  Therefore, the district court reasoned, “[t]he 
State Defendants could thus be liable not because the decision to turn away a same-
sex couple itself was state action, but because a jury might find that the decision to 
turn away a same-sex couple was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
action taken by the State Defendants.”157 
Similar to the Dumont case, students who have been denied admission to or 
expelled from participating private schools with anti-LGBT policies could argue that 
the state action arises from the state’s permission of the schools’ discriminatory 
behavior.  It is certainly reasonably foreseeable that some faith-based private 
schools would discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.  It is important to 
acknowledge the difference between the Dumont case and the private-school-choice 
programs discussed in this article.  Dumont dealt with a contract between the state 
and faith-based agencies.  There is no such contractual arrangement between the 
state and participating private schools in private-school-choice programs.  But this 
distinction should not matter because states require private schools to register with 
the state and seek state approval for participation in the program.158  In addition, 
states often advertise the existence of the programs and the schools that participate 
on state websites.159  Arguably, state voucher programs have set up an even more 
 
154  Id. at 746. 
155  Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
156  Id. 
157  Id. (internal brackets omitted) (citing Paige v. Coyner, 614 F. 3d 273, 280 (6th Cir. 2010)); See 
also, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (where U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to examine a case involving a religious organization that was denied a city contract 
because it refused, based on religious grounds, to provide services to married same-sex couples 
who sought to participate in the organization’s foster care program). 
158  See, e.g., Georgia Department of Education, Special Need Scholarship Program 
Resources: 20–21 Private School Application (2020), https://www.gadoe.org/External-
Affairs-and-Policy/Policy/Pages/Special-Needs-Scholarship-Program-Resources.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/VX4M-EE29]. 
159  See, e.g., Ohio Department of Education, Directory of Nonpublic Schools and 
Service Providers that Participate in Scholarship Programs (2019), 
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elaborate system that foreseeably leads to sexual orientation discrimination.  
Similarly to Dumont, states could stop this foreseeable discriminatory behavior by 
forbidding it.  
Additionally, students might be able to show that states have significantly 
encouraged participating private schools to enforce their anti-LGBT admissions 
policies, thus establishing state action.  At first glance, this task seems 
insurmountable.  Citing American Manufacturers, a court might characterize the 
failure of private school choice laws to prohibit participating schools from 
discriminating on the basis of race as “state inaction.”160  But an examination of 
these statutes’ legislative history might reveal that lawmakers were signaling to 
certain schools that it was okay to exclude LGBT students.  For example, several 
states include statutory provisions that require parents and students to comply with 
all private school policies, which would include the discriminatory practices causing 
exclusion of LGBT youth and families.161  Moreover, some states, like Arizona, alert 
participating private schools that they “shall not be required to alter [their] creed[s], 
practices, admissions polic[ies] or curricul[a].”162  In these instances, such explicitly 
permissive policies exist in statutes that omit any prohibition against religious or 
sexual orientation discrimination.163  This combination, permitting exclusionary 
policies in the absence of prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of 
religion 164  and/or sexual orientation, could be read as tacit state approval of 
exclusionary policies.  In such cases, courts might conclude that states were doing 
more than merely approving of or acquiescing to the discriminatory practices of 
these schools.  
The fallout surrounding the Orlando Sentinel’s reporting of the anti-LGBT 
admissions policies of participating Florida private schools provides an example.  
This revelation came at the time the state legislature was considering House Bill 
7067, 165  a bill that would increase the scope of Florida’s private-school-choice 




  American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 53 (1999). 
161  See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. 1002.39(9)(d) (2020); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-2114(i) (2020); La. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 17:4022(6), 17:4021(D)(4) (2020); Miss. Code. Ann. §37-173-11(d) (2020). 
162  A.R.S. § 15-2404(C). 
163  Eckes, Mead, & Ulm, supra note 29, at 543. 
  Recall that the voucher program upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court included a prohibition 
against religious discrimination. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645, 662–63 (2002). 
165  H.R. 7067, 2020 Leg., 123rd Sess. (Fla. 2020).  
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Scholarship and Florida Tax Credit Programs.  Rep. Carlos Guillermo Smith 
responded by introducing an amendment to the bill that would prohibit 
participating private schools from discriminating against LGBT students.166  The 
state house of representatives voted down the amendment, even though debate 
illuminated the exclusionary practices of some participating schools.167  During the 
debate, Rep. Jennifer Sullivan asserted that the amendment was unnecessary 
because no student had reported being expelled from a school because of their 
sexual orientation.168  However, the statements of Rep. Kimberly Daniels, who also 
opposed the amendment, suggested that other concerns were at play.  Daniels 
expressed her opposition to the amendment by acknowledging that Smith had a 
right to advocate for the LGBT community.  But Daniels also asserted that she had 
a right to defend the concerns of religious private schools, explaining, “I’m a 
champion of the G-O-S-P-E-L. The gospel of Jesus Christ.”169  Daniels went on to 
argue that a non-discrimination requirement would violate the Free Exercise 
Clause of participating schools with anti-LGBT admissions requirements. 170  
Significantly, she argued that a non-discrimination provision “would trespass on 
what we call in the military a A.O. . . .  These are the areas of operation of these 
private schools.”171  Daniels’ statements suggest that she was not merely acquiescing 
to the admissions decisions of these schools.  Rather, she was defending these 
schools’ “right” to discriminate.172  At a minimum, such state actions may be viewed 
as deliberately indifferent 173  to the discriminatory effects of such policy 
 
166  House Amend. 856839, H.R. 7067. (failed).  
167  Fla. H.R. Sess. Video (Mar. 6, 2020), supra note 10, at 3:38:24. 
168  Id. at 3:18:36.  
169  Id. at 2:21:59.  
170  Id. at 2:22:59.  
171  Id. at 2:23:07. 
172  Please note the discussion explaining how the state may be vulnerable to a state action 
challenge by creating a private school system that could foreseeably lead to sexual orientation 
discrimination by some participating private schools. See supra notes 145-164. 
173  Courts have held that governmental actors who act with deliberate indifference to 
knowledge of discriminatory complaints have violated non-discriminatory 
requirements of both the Fourteenth Amendment and federal statutes. See generally 
Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that deliberate 
indifference to actual notice of a teacher’s sexual misconduct with a student violated 
the student’s Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process);  Davis ex rel. 
LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (holding that 
deliberate indifference to notice of peer sexual harassment violates Title IX). 
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pronouncements. 
4. Entwinement Test 
The entwinement test provides that a private entity is a state actor “when it is 
entwined with governmental policies, or when [the] government is entwined in [its] 
management or control.”174  The Court first articulated this theory in Brentwood v. 
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association. 175   In Brentwood, an interscholastic 
athletic association had penalized a private school for violating the association’s 
regulations relating to recruitment.176  The athletic association was a not-for-profit 
organization that coordinated sports competitions for public and private high 
schools in the state of Tennessee.177  Brentwood Academy, a private parochial school, 
was one of the voluntary members of the athletic association.  After the association 
placed Brentwood Academy on probation for player recruitment violations, the 
school sued.178  The private school argued that the association was a state actor and 
therefore its enforcement of the rule was in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, among other claims.179   
The Court found that the athletic association was a state actor under the 
entwinement test.  In reaching this decision, the Court observed that 84% of the 
association’s membership consisted of public schools. 180   There was also 
entwinement between the state board of education and the association.181  State 
board members served on the association’s committees in a nonvoting capacity, and 
the association’s ministerial members were treated as state employees “to the extent 
of being eligible for membership in the state retirement system.”182 
Subsequent litigants have not been able to convince courts of similar 
“entwinements” so as to impute state action from the acts of private entities.  For 
example, applying the entwinement test, the First Circuit in Logiodice v. Trustees of 
Maine Central Institute held that a private school, which had contracted with a school 
district to educate its high-school-age students at public expense, was not a state 
 
174  Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athl. Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted).  
175  Id.  
176  Id. at 293.  
177  Id. at 291.  
178  Id. at 293. 
179  Id.  
180  Id. at 299–300.  
181  Id. at 300.  
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actor under § 1983 when it disciplined a student.183  The student alleged that the 
school violated his due process rights by suspending him for seventeen days without 
a hearing.184  The contract provided the school’s board of trustees with sole authority 
over school disciplinary matters.185  
The First Circuit rejected the claim that the private school was a state actor 
under the entwinement test.  The court identified several similarities between the 
instant case and Brentwood: “The state regulate[d] contract schools in various 
respects;” the school district sponsored 80% of the contract school students; and “in 
certain respects (public busing to extracurricular events, transfer of lower-school 
records, assistance with registration), [the contract school’s] students [we]re 
treated as if they were regular public school students.”186  However, the First Circuit 
found no entwinement because the private trustees, not public school officials, ran 
the school, and the school’s contract provided that the trustees had sole authority 
over student discipline.187 
It is highly unlikely that a court will rule that the anti-LGBT admissions policies 
of participating private schools are subject to constitutional scrutiny under the 
entwinement test.  Unlike Brentwood, there is no entwinement.  In fact, the situation 
is similar to Logiodice: state laws give control over school admissions policies to 
private schools.   
5. State Enforcement Test 
The Supreme Court established this concept of state action in Shelley v. 
Kraemer.188  Shelley encompassed two cases concerning restrictive covenants that 
excluded certain races from owning or occupying real property.189  The first case 
involved a ruling by the Supreme Court of Missouri. 190  In 1911, thirty property 
owners signed an agreement that prevented their property from being occupied for 
fifty years “by any person not of the Caucasian race.”191  In 1945, the Shelleys, a Black 
 
183  Logiodice v. Tr. of Maine Cent. Inst., 296 F.3d 22, 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2002).  
184  Id. at 25.  
185  Id. at 28.  
186  Id.  
187  Id.  
188  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  
189  Id. at 4, 6.  
190  Id.  
191  Id. at 4–5.  
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family, received a warranty deed to one of the parcels subject to the covenant.192  A 
white owner of another parcel of land under the covenant sued in state court, 
demanding a judgment enforcing the covenant and divesting the Shelleys of the 
title.193  A state trial court denied the requested relief.194  The Missouri Supreme 
Court reversed and directed the lower court to enforce the covenant.195  The second 
case came from the Michigan Supreme Court.196  That court also enforced a similarly 
worded racially restrictive covenant.197  
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed both decisions on the ground that the judicial 
enforcement of the racial covenants violated the Equal Protection Clause.198  The 
Court observed that these agreements by themselves did not deprive the prospective 
Black landowners of their constitutional rights. 199   However, the judicial 
enforcement in state courts of these racially restrictive covenants did constitute 
state action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.200  The Court reached this 
conclusion because “the States have made available to [the private persons wishing 
to discriminate] the full coercive power of the government to deny to petitioners, 
on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights.”201   
It is important to note, however, that legal scholars have expressed concern 
about the danger that the state action theory first enunciated in Shelley.  As Laurence 
Tribe has explained, the consistent application of Shelley’s principles “would require 
individuals to conform their private agreements to constitutional standards 
whenever, as almost always, the individuals might later seek the security of 
potential judicial enforcement.” 202   To avoid this problem, several courts have 
limited the scope of Shelley to disputes involving racial discrimination. 203   This 
 
192  Id. at 5.  
193  Id. at 6.  
194  Id. 
195  Id.  
196  Id.  
197  Id. at 6–7.  
198  Id. at 22.  
199  See id. at 14.  
200  Id. at 20.  
201  Id. at 19.
202  Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1697 (2d ed. 1988).  
203  See, e.g., Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001) 
(“Although the United States Supreme Court has held that judicial effectuation of a racially 
restrictive covenant constitutes state action…, it has largely limited this holding to the facts of 
those cases.”); Mahoney v. Nat'l Org. for Women, 681 F. Supp. 129, 133 (D. Conn. 1987) (“However, 
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restriction would seemingly foreclose any challenge to anti-LGBT provisions under 
a state enforcement theory of state action. 
However, in Lavoie v. Bigwood,204  the First Circuit applied a more expansive 
approach to Shelley that could enable students to challenge the state enforcement of 
anti-LGBT admissions provisions.  In Lavoie, a tenant rented space in a mobile park 
located in New Hampshire. 205   After complaining to public officials about the 
owner’s management of the park, the tenant alleged that the owner brought an 
eviction proceeding through a state municipal court.206  In response, the tenant 
sued in state court, alleging that the defendants sought the eviction in retaliation 
for the tenant’s exercise of his rights of speech and association. 207   The tenant 
further claimed that New Hampshire’s landlord-tenant and zoning laws 
transformed the “purely private” landlord-tenant relationship into state action.208  
A federal district court dismissed the case, finding that the owner’s alleged conduct 
was not state action.209  
The First Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision. 210   In reaching this 
conclusion, the appellate court identified two “polar propositions” in the state 
action jurisprudence.211  Terms like “state compulsion or involvement” resided at the 
“state action” pole whereas phrases like “neutrality,” “purely private,” and “merely 
private” resided at the opposite pole.212  In sorting out the use of these terms, the 
court acknowledged that states were involved in private action to some degree.213  
To develop its own theory of neutrality, the First Circuit relied on a Supreme 
 
subsequent decisions have carefully limited Shelley to its facts”); Parks v. “Mr. Ford”, 556 F.2d 132, 
136 n. 6a (3rd Cir. 1977) (“In cases [in which state courts enforced to take actions which are 
permitted but not compelled by law], state action has been found only when the doctrine of Shelley 
. . .  has been found applicable.”); Tansey-Warner, Inc. v. E. Coast Resorts, Inc., No. 720, 1978 WL 
22460, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1978) (“Extensions of state action have been limited to cases 
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204  Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972).  
205  Id. at 8. 
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Court case, Griffin v. Maryland.214  In Griffin, a deputy sheriff sought to prosecute 
certain Black patrons for criminal trespass because they refused to leave a privately-
owned amusement park.215  Maryland contended that there was no state action 
because it was “not really enforcing a policy of segregation since the owner’s 
ultimate purpose [was] immaterial to the state.”216  The Court rejected this assertion 
because the president of the corporation managing the park had asked the deputy 
sheriff to enforce its policy of racial segregation.217  
The First Circuit took the following principle from Griffin: “A state, then, must 
be more strictly neutral than to permit any of its officers to identify the subjects of 
the discrimination in the first instance.”218  Although Griffin did not cite Shelley, the 
First Circuit viewed Shelley to be an earlier application of this neutrality principle.219  
To enforce the covenant, the court explained, “the state court had necessarily to take 
evidence that the prospective buyer was black and to take notice that the clause 
being enforced was a racially restrictive one.”220  Citing Shelley and Griffin, the First 
Circuit then developed a theory of neutrality to be applied to cases apart from racial 
discrimination:   
[A] state may at the behest of private persons apply sanctions pursuant to general 
rules of law which have discriminatory as well as non-discriminatory application if it 
does not accept the responsibility of employing a discriminatory classification. Such 
responsibility would exist when, in resorting to a state sanction, a private party must 
necessarily make the state privy to his discriminatory purpose. Similarly, in such a case 
as this, the state would retain a neutral posture unless it was necessarily apprised of the 
landlord’s purpose to violate rights of free speech and association. While not entirely 
satisfactory, this approach at least recognizes conscious state involvement without 
insisting upon an unattainable purity.221 
Applying this standard of neutrality, the First Circuit reasoned that an eviction in 
retaliation of First Amendment rights, standing alone, was private action. 222  
However, it held that the mobile park tenant sufficiently alleged state action by 
“asserting a town purpose to restrict sites for mobile homes and a concomitant 
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private monopoly over the allocation of those sites.”223  It is important to note that 
the Lavoie case did not involve the state court enforcement of a private person’s 
request to deprive another person of their constitutional rights.  Nevertheless, 
Lavoie clearly indicates that state enforcement of a private action would be state 
action if the party to a lawsuit apprises a state court of its unconstitutional 
motivation.224  
Building on Shelley and Lavoie, plaintiff families may argue that the state 
effectively enforces private schools’ anti-LGBT policies that deprive students of a 
state benefit under the Due Process Clause.  Such state agency enforcement would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause on the basis of sexual orientation.  For example, 
Indiana requires that each private school annually register and be approved for 
participation in its voucher program.225  That process requires each school to submit 
a current copy of the school’s admissions policy.226  Only those schools that have 
been “approved” by the state agency are listed as participating schools.227  As such, a 
school’s admissions policy that denies admission to LGBT students gains approval 
and enforcement by the state.  Plaintiffs may also argue that because the child meets 
all state eligibility requirements for participation in the voucher program, any 
deprivation of the benefit is also a deprivation of a property interest—the 
entitlement to participate in a state benefit on terms equal to others.  To establish a 
property interest to this benefit, the student would have to establish “more than an 
abstract need or desire” and “more than a unilateral benefit.”228  Instead, the student 
must have a “legitimate claim of entitlement.”229  Property interests are not created 
by the federal constitution, but are derived from independent sources such as state 
law.230  Although these programs are created by state law, federal constitution law 
determines whether this interest associated with the benefit of voucher 
 
223  Id. at 14.  
224  See Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Ct. of Puerto Rico for the Dist. of Arecibo, 988 F.2d 252, 260 
(1st Cir. 1993) (finding no state action because was unaware of any discriminatory animus 
regarding the restrictive covenant).   
225  Ind. Code § 20-51-4-3(f) (2020); see also School Application Memo, Ind. Dep’t of Educ., 
https://www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/choice/choice-school-app-memo-2021.pdf 
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226  School Application Memo, supra note 225.  
227  Id. 
228  Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
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230  Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales ex rel. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005). 
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participation rises to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement.231  
By examining the school choice statutes, regulations, and legislative history, the 
student would attempt to show that state law guarantees them a right to equal 
access to a state benefit232 —participation in a voucher program—and that the 
state’s role in tacitly enforcing the school’s action is attempting to deny the student 
of that benefit.  Representative Anna Eskamani raised this concern in the debate 
over House Bill 7067, which expanded school choice in Florida.   She explained, 
. . . as we expand this program to more and more kids,. . . you’re going to see more 
kids who are gay who won’t benefit, and I am concerned that if you are a gay child 
growing up in a different part of the state, and you want to practice choice, but every 
school in that perimeter has anti-LGBT policies, does that child have choice?233  
If a student could establish such a property right to participation in the program, it 
would follow that the state court enforcement of the anti-LGBT policy would violate 
the Equal Protection Clause.  As in Shelley, the state would “have made available to 
[the private persons wishing to discriminate] the full coercive power of the 
government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of [sexual orientation].”234  In 
effect, the argument would be that anti-LGBT policies are the restrictive covenants 
of voucher program participation. 
I V . C O N C L U S I O N  
As this discussion shows, the reason we have yet to see litigation on the 
exclusion of LGBT students from private schools participating in voucher programs 
likely stems from the obstacles to convincing a court that sufficient state action 
exists to incur the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In fact, those theories 
that would involve suing the schools directly–the public function test, the symbiotic 
relationship test, and the entwinement test–hold little promise of success.  In each 
instance, it would be difficult, given existing precedent, to convince a court that the 
participation of the private school in a public program transformed school officials 
into state actors subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.235 
However, two approaches may provide an avenue for success: the state 
 
231  Id. at 757. 
232  Plaintiffs may also assert violations of Title VI for denial of equal access to a state benefit. See 
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compulsion test and the state enforcement test.  In both instances, plaintiffs would 
challenge the state directly for its unequal implementation of the voucher program.  
In other words, like the plaintiffs in Dumont, challengers would “allege that their 
claims concern only the State’s provision of taxpayer-funded government services 
based on religious and discriminatory criteria and do not challenge any private 
[school’s] provision of [educational] services or use of non-public funds.” 236  
Whether cast as state compulsion or state enforcement, courts might well agree that 
states cannot divorce their actions from those of the private schools when the result 
is a group of children with limited access to a state-created benefit.  As the Supreme 
Court ruled in the landmark marriage equality case, Obergefell v. Hodges, 
Indeed, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new 
insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most 
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.237  
It is also interesting to observe that many of the cases that have refused to 
recognize state action have litigated claims under the Due Process Clause rather 
than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and many asserted 
the rights of adult workers rather than those of students.  While both claims 
obviously hinge on the presence or absence of a state actor, the fact that the 
situations involve exclusionary admissions policies directed at a discreet group of 
children may give jurists pause.  The parallels between these exclusionary practices 
and earlier practices of private schools’ denial of children’s access on the basis of 
race238 may make courts more open to the complaints of excluded children and 
families. 
It is also important to acknowledge that getting a court to recognize state action 
is only the first step.  Even if a court recognizes the state’s role in the exclusion of 
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LGBT children from state-funded voucher programs, plaintiffs would then have to 
survive states’ defenses of those programs.  For example, a state may argue that a 
child can choose another private school without similar restrictions or could return 
to the public school system.  As such, the state may argue that the child has not 
suffered sufficient injury to bring a claim.  However, to quote the Dumont court once 
more, “[p]laintiffs’ need not demonstrate that they would have been completely  
foreclosed–only that they could not compete for the right to [to participate in the 
voucher program] on the same footing as everyone else.”239 
States may also contend that their actions serve the legitimate purpose of 
respecting the religious rights of participating private schools.  While a full 
explication of the tension between religious freedoms of the schools on the one 
hand and the rights of children to enjoy the benefits of state programs free from 
discrimination on the basis of religion and sexual orientation on the other is beyond 
the scope of this paper, a key to this tension may be in the purpose of the program.240  
Because the programs have been designed to benefit children and their families, the 
argument could be made that the state’s first obligation is to ensure that any benefit 
created by the programs is offered to those primary beneficiaries on equal terms.  
In fact, the Zelman Court’s approval of the Cleveland voucher program rested on the 
idea that the benefit accrued to the child and that the funding received by 
participating schools was an indirect result of the private choices of these parents.241  
The children were viewed as the primary beneficiaries of the program.  Elevating a 
school’s asserted right to deny admission to a child on the basis of sexual orientation 
would subvert the primary purpose of the program.  Moreover, the Supreme Court 
directed that any voucher program that includes religious schools must ensure that 
“[p]rogram benefits are available to participating families on neutral terms, with no 
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reference to religion.”242  A state’s approval and enforcement of private schools’ 
exclusionary practices result in participation being offered on non-neutral terms 
with reference to religion. 
The last five years have borne witness to incredible advances in the recognition 
of the rights of LGBT individuals.  From the landmark ruling guaranteeing the right 
to marry243 to the recent recognition that federal non-discrimination law forbids 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, 244  the 
Supreme Court has mandated that states respect the rights of all individuals to be 
treated fairly.  In so doing, the protections of federal law have been extended and 
the Court has explicitly noted that the rights of every LGBT person must be legally 
protected from state actions that result in the diminution of a person’s dignity.  It 
would be a perversion of justice to place state-operated voucher programs outside 
the ambit of those protections.  For as the Court observed just five short years ago, 
“The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes 
certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and 
express their identity.” 245   That liberty must extend to all children who seek to 
participate in state voucher programs.  Only then will the troubling headlines cease. 
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